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FEDERAL COURTS - WHAT IS AN EQUITABLE CLAIM TO REAL PROPERTY
WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 57 OF THE JUDICIAL ConE? - Plaintiff,
an Ohio corporation, was the lessee of land in Kentucky. It entered into a contract with defendant lessor, a resident of the District of Columbia, to renew the
lease. Defendant failed to carry out his agreement, and plaintiff" sued for specific performance of the contract to lease in the United States District Court for
Eastern Kentucky, jurisdiction being based on diversity of citizenship.1 Plaintiff was unable to obtain personal service upon defendant, but obtained service
by publication under section 57 of the Judicial Code,2 which authorizes the

1 z8 U~ S. C. (.1940), § 41 (1) (b).
3 36 Stat. L. noz (19n), z8 U.S. C. (1940), § n8.
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court to take jurisdiction and to- allow service by publication in "any suit • • •
to enforce any ••• equitable ••• claim to ••• real or personal property within
the district." Defendant appeared specially and objected to the jurisdiction of
the court. Plaintiff appealed from an adverse ruling. 8 Held, that the court is
without jurisdiction. This is not an action based upon an equitable claim to-rea! property, but rather seeks only an act by the defendant, i.e. execution of the
lease, and is therefore an action in personam. Dan Cohen Realty Co. 'lJ. National
Sa'llings & Trust Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1942) 125 F. (2d) 288.
The historic position of the courts of equity seems to be that an equity decree
is binding against the person of the defendant only. 4 Thus with a contract to convey realty, the decree of the court ordering the defendant to convey title will not
operate to convey title of itself, but will be successful only to the extent the court
is able to compel the defendant to execute a deed by pressure exerted. against his
person. State statutes have substantially changed this by providing that in the
event the defendant fails to convey, the court can authorize a commissioner to
make a conveyance which will have the same effect as if made by_ the, defendant
himself, or in some states, by providing that the decree will have the effect of a
conveyance itself. 5 This in effect makes the equity decree operative in rem. 6
The right of federal courts to convey legal title by their decrees in equity on the
strength of a state statute giving such power to the state court having jurisdiction
of the property in dispute has frequently been upheld.7 While the objection has
been made that the state statutes regulating procedure in state courts should not
affect the procedure in the federal courts,8 it would seem that the state statute
creates a new substantive right enforceable in the federal court. 9 Likewise Rule
70 of the rules of civil procedure,1° providing for both the decree of the court
and a conveyance of a master appointed by the court as a means of passing title,
would appear to answer any objection as to the inadequacy of the procedure
(D. C. Ky. 1941) 36 F. Supp. 536.
LANGDELL, A SuMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING, 2d ed., § 43 {1883). Writs
of sequestration, whereby the chattels of the recalcitrant defendant were sold to satisfy
the plaintiff's claim, and the income of his realty devoted to the same purpose, and
writs of assistance whereby the equity court put the plaintiff in possession of the land
which was the subject of dispute and kept him there, were recognized exceptions to this
rule. WALSH, EQUITY, § IO (1930). To the effect that there may be other exceptions,
see Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. (48 U. S.) 198 (1849); Pennington v. Gibson, 16
How. (57 U.S.) 65 (1853); People's Savings Bank v. Eberts, 96 Mich, 396, 55 N. W.
996 (1893).
6 See the statutes collected in HusTON, THE ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES IN
EQUITY l 57 ( 191 5) •
11 Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, IO S. Ct. 557 (1890); Garfein v. Mclnnis,
248 N. Y. 261, 162 N. E. 73 (1928).
7 Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. (38 U. S.) 195 (1839); Langdon v. Sherwood, 124
U.S. 74, 8 S. Ct. 429 (1888); Single v. Scott Paper Mfg. Co., (C. C. Ohio, 1893)
55 F. 553; Deck v. Whitman, (C. C. Tenn. 1899) 96 F. 873.
8 HUSTON, THE ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES IN EQUITY 37 (1915).
9 Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. (38 U. S.) 195 (1839); 5 PoMERoY, EQUITY JuR1sPRUDENcE, 3d ed., 25, note 33 (1905). This appears to be another example of the
difficulty in drawing the line between what is procedure and what is substance,
10 28 U. S. C. (1940), following § 723c.
8
4
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of the federal courts. Thus, if under the law of the state wherein the property
which is the subject of dispute lies, the plaintiff would be entitled to a conveyance of the land, independent of the action of the defendant, the plaintiff would
have an "equitable ••• claim to ••• real or personal property within the district"
within the meaning of section 5 7 of the Judicial Code, as distinguished from a
claim against the person. 11 Here it seems that the Kentucky state courts wo_uld
give such relief/ 2 and therefore the court in the principal case unjustifiably
refused to take jurisdiction. Particularly unfortunate is the court's approval of
the language of the district judge resting the decision on the ground that "The
only relief asked is that the defendants be compelled to execute the lease •••
a decree operative against the defendants in person and not otherwise." Thus
to emphasize a feature of the procedure formerly employed in all actions in the
High Court of Chancery but increasingly abandoned in the course of the last
t_wo centuries is to invite capricious and unintelligible distinctions. The point is
illustrated in this case. In its effort to reconcile the decisions, the court draws a
line betwe1:n t!Je action for specific performance of a contract for sale of land and
the action for cancellation of a like contract, though both were once implemented
solely by a decree in personam, requiring action by the defendant and both are
now implemented by the self-executing decree. This, it is submitted, is case-law
at its worst, a perpetual impediment to intelligibility and therefore a perpetual
impediment to certainty,-perpetual, that is, until the distinction is beneficently
forgotten.
Charles J. O'Laughlin

11 To the effect that the existence of a claim under § 57 is a question of state
law, see Single v. Scott Paper Mfg. Co., (C. C. Ohio, 1893) 55 F. 553.
12 To the effect that Kentucky will give specific performance of a contract to
lease, see Mattingly's Exr. v. Brents, 155 Ky. 570, 159 S. W. I 157 (1913). Ky. Civ.
-Code (Carroll, Baldwin Rev. 1938), § 394, gives the Kentucky courts power to con:vey title by means of a deed executed by a commissioner appointed by the court. See
Todd v. Lancaster, 104 Ky. 427, 47 S. W. 336 (1898); Savin v. Delaney,'229 Ky.
226, 16 S. W. (2d) 1039 (1929).

